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Preparing for Poison Warfare: The Ethics
and Politics of Britain’s Chemical
Weapons Program, 1915–1945
Ulf Schmidt
Abstract Allied political and military leaders have frequently been credited both
with considerable foresight and with strategic and moral leadership for avoiding
chemical warfare during the Second World War. Scholars have not, however, fully
acknowledged how close Allied forces came to launching a full-scale chemical
onslaught in various theatres of war. The paper offers a thorough reconstruction of
Allied chemical warfare planning which takes a close look at the development of
Britain’s chemical weapons program since the First World War. The ﬁndings
suggest that no “lack of preparedness,” as it existed in the initial stages of the
conflict in 1939/1940, would have deterred the Allies from launching chemical
warfare if the military situation had required it. Allied forces were planning to
launch retaliatory chemical warfare ever since they had been attacked with chlorine
gas in 1915. Just War theorists at ﬁrst opposed the use of this new weapon and
campaigned for an internationally enforced legal ban. The paper argues, however,
that post-war military and political exigencies forced the advocates of the Just War
tradition to construct new arguments and principles which would make this type of
war morally and militarily acceptable. The paper explores the ways in which
military strategists, scientists, and government ofﬁcials attempted to justify the
development, possession, and use of chemical weapons, and contextualizes
Britain’s delicate balancing act between deterrence and disarmament in the interwar
period.
1 Introduction
Allied political and military leaders have frequently been credited both with con-
siderable foresight and with strategic and moral leadership for avoiding chemical
warfare during the Second World War. Scholars have not, however, fully
acknowledged how very close Allied forces came to launching a full-scale chemical
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onslaught in the European and far eastern theaters of war.1 Although Allied
intelligence was aware of Japan’s chemical warfare operations against China, which
had commenced in 1937, the Allied military decided against retaliatory measures.2
Chemical warfare would not only have violated international law and morality as it
was known and understood at the time, but would have changed beyond recognition
the image and conduct of modern warfare for generations to come. The fact that a
potentially devastating event did not happen is seen as tangible evidence of the
underlying morality and humanity of Western governments in defending modern
civilization. A more thorough reconstruction of Allied chemical warfare planning,
as is proposed here, one which incorporate and takes a close look at the develop-
ment of Britain’s chemical weapons program since the First World War, allows us
to recognize that no “lack of preparedness,” however serious it may have been in
the initial stages of the conflict, would have deterred the Allies from launching
chemical warfare if the military situation had required it. Allied forces were indeed
planning for chemical warfare ever since they had been attacked with chlorine gas
in 1915.3
From the moment chemical weapons appeared on the stage of armed conflict,
Just War theorists opposed the use of this new weapon and campaigned for an
internationally enforced legal ban. Chemical weapons, they argued, violated the
requirement for non-combatant immunity because they indiscriminately killed and
injured children, women, and the elderly. In the 1920s, however, military and
political exigencies forced the advocates of the Just War tradition to construct new
arguments and principles that would make this type of war morally and militarily
acceptable. Responding to an international legal ban on poison gas, government
experts began to condemn the inhumanity of armed conflict, while simultaneously
accepting the need for this type of warfare in certain circumstances. There is
therefore a need to examine the ways in which military strategists, scientists,
diplomats, and government ofﬁcials attempted to justify the development, posses-
sion, and use of chemical weapons through different means and methods of pro-
paganda, and to contextualize Britain’s delicate balancing act between deterrence
and disarmament in the postwar period.
1For some of the scholarship on the history of biological and chemical warfare since the First
World War see SIPRI (1971); Harris and Paxman (1982); Haber (1986); Richter (1994); Evans
(2000); Balmer (2001); Hammond and Carter (2002); Schmaltz (2005, 2006a, b, c); Wheelis et al.
(2006); Tucker (2006); Schmidt (2006, 2007a, b, 2013); Schmidt and Frewer (2007); Spiers
(2010); Avery (2013). For a comprehensive analysis of chemical warfare research and human
experiments during the twentieth and twenty-ﬁrst centuries, see also Schmidt (2015). Sections of
this chapter have been reproduced with permission by Palgrave published in Schmidt (2012).
2See Van Moon and Ellis (1989, 1996).
3Spiers, for instance, suggests that “lack of preparedness was a principal reason for non-use of
chemical or biological weapons between the major belligerents in the Second World War” (Spiers
2010, 57). For the use of chlorine in 1915 see Cowell et al. (2007).
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2 Ypres 1915
By the time the ﬁrst major chemical warfare attack in modern history came to an
end, the Allies had lost hundreds, if not thousands, of soldiers. Allied propaganda
estimated that 5000 soldiers had been killed and 10,000 had been wounded, though
these numbers are generally accepted to have been exaggerated (Szöllösi-Janze
1998, 318).4 Whatever the exact casualty ﬁgures, witness accounts conﬁrmed that
Allied troops had been exposed to one of the ﬁrst weapons of mass destruction,
which killed men slowly and painfully from within rather than wounding them on
the outside. Total panic had gripped thousands of seasoned soldiers and civilians
who fled from the toxic fumes; the modern battleﬁeld had become a site of
unimaginable horror and untold human suffering.
Despite a four-mile hole in the Western Front, and an enemy army in disarray,
the German military, having failed to anticipate the effects of the “new infernal
invention,” as some called it, and lacking the necessary reserves to break through
Allied defenses, was unable to exploit their sudden strategic advantage (Buffetaut
2008). Among those disappointed by the German lack of planning was the head of
the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, Fritz Haber, who was instrumental in
developing German chemical warfare agents. If only the military authorities had
launched a full-scale offensive, he complained, “instead of the experiment at Ypres,
the Germans would have won” (Harris and Paxman 1982, 10). Haber saw gas
warfare as a more “humane” weapon of war:
The gas weapons are surely not more horrible than flying metal fragments, on the contrary,
the percentage of deadly gas injuries is comparably smaller, there are no mutilations and
nothing is known […] in terms of follow-up injuries (Haber 1924, 35; see 25–41).
In 1919, much to the shock of the civilized world, Haber was awarded the Nobel
Prize for Chemistry.5
Rejected as immoral and illegal by many, the new weaponry was greatly feared
by the soldiers on the battleﬁeld. Gas warfare became as much a psychological as a
physical weapon. Often the experience of being gassed led to real and imagined
clinical symptoms for years to come. The possibility of being killed by asphyxiating
gases triggered deep-seated emotional responses and occasional nervous break-
downs which psychiatrists classiﬁed as “gas neurosis”; in other cases, soldiers
exposed to blistering agents were classed as suffering from “gas hysteria,” since the
substances could cause conjunctivitis and temporary blindness (Harrison 2010,
106–109). Eyewitnesses recalled that “gas shock was as frequent as shellshock”
(Shephard 2000, 64).
4Piet Chielens from the Flanders Fields Museum, Ypres, Belgium, has recently suggested that the
number of “casualties” of the German gas attack near the Belgian town of Ypres in April 1915 was
signiﬁcantly lower than previously assumed (Chielens 2014; also Corrigan 2003, 164–165).
5For Haber’s biography see Szöllösi-Janze (1998); Stolzenberg (2004); Charles (2005); see also
the account by his son Lutz F. Haber in Haber (1986).
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No one had been prepared for this kind and scale of warfare; few had ever
imagined that poison gas would be used; almost all were shocked that the world
would never be the same, that armed conflict would forever be tainted by what
many perceived to be an unmanly, dirty form of warfare. As early as 22 April 1915,
Michel Toudy, a soldier of the Belgian Grenadiers tasked with strengthening
front-line defenses in the immediate aftermath of the ﬁrst gas attack, noted in his
war diary: “Throughout the entire night French territorials arrive in our trenches
coughing and saying that it is not permitted to attack aged family fathers with
asphyxiating gas.”6 Many Allied servicemen believed at this point that Germany
had violated international conventions governing the conduct of war, which in
many ways it had—if not the letter of the law, then certainly its spirit.
The German use of steel cylinders for the delivery of poison gas was meant to
ensure that a large area would be cleared for a ground offensive once the gas had
dissipated but it also had another, more profound rationale. Since the end of the
nineteenth century, international law had prohibited the use of poison gas. Fearing
that the ongoing arms race with Germany could weaken the fledgling Russian
economy, and further destabilize the regime through strikes and revolutionary
activities, Tsar Nicholas II had initiated the First Peace Conference in The Hague to
revise and ratify the declarations about the laws and customs of war that had been
negotiated in 1874 in Brussels. In 1899, representatives of twenty-six countries,
including Britain, France, Russia, and Germany, had signed The Hague Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War, which not only regulated the treatment
of prisoners of war and the care of sick and wounded, but also banned certain types
of warfare and the use of modern technology, including aerial bombardment,
chemical warfare, and hollow point bullets. Article 23(a) speciﬁcally prohibited the
employment of “poison or poisoned arms.”7 In a separately signed document, The
Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, the contracting states also
pledged to outlaw the use of poison gas as a means of future warfare by “abstaining
from the use of projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating
or deleterious gases” (Tucker 2006, 10f.). Attempting to ban weapons which did not
yet exist, The Hague Declaration contained three major loopholes which the bel-
ligerents exploited during the First World War: the use of irritants, the employment
of gas through means other than by using projectiles, and the use of gas-ﬁlled, yet
shrapnel-causing bombs, were not covered by The Hague Declaration. Faced with a
war of attrition, the German army was less concerned about the inherent legality or
morality of gas warfare but more about semantics. Whereas the use of gas-ﬁlled
projectiles was against international law, the German military considered the use of
poison gas released from cylinders to be lawful. Days after Germany’s ﬁrst gas
attack, the Kölnische Zeitung claimed that “the letting loose of smoke clouds,
6In Flanders Fields Museum, Documentation Centre, Toudy papers. I am grateful to Dominiek
Dendooven for sharing this source with me. See also Dendooven (2005).
7Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Custom of War on Land and its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899.
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which, in a gentle wind, move quite slowly towards the enemy, is not only per-
missible by international law, but is an extraordinarily mild method of war” (Harris
and Paxman 1982, 5). The Allied powers, however, described it as an act of
inhumanity that violated “all codes of civilized behaviour” (SIPRI 1971, 231). It
certainly did not bode well that the German military had given the poisonous cloud
the code-name “Disinfection,” a cover to confuse Allied intelligence, surely, but
also one which portrayed enemy soldiers and civilians as vermin to be exterminated
(Buffetaut 2008, 20).
Twenty-four hours after Germany’s ﬁrst gas attack, Sir John French, the
Commander of the British Expeditionary Force, inquired about the existing supply
of respirators and requested from London that “immediate steps be taken in retal-
iation to supply similar means of the most effective kind for the use of our own
troops.”8 In his reply, Lord Kitchener, the War Minister, called for caution: “The
use of asphyxiating gases is, as you are aware, contrary to the rules and usages of
war. Before we fall to the level of the degraded Germans I must submit the matter to
the government.”9 To investigate the matter, Kitchener called upon two civilian
scientists: John S. Haldane (1860–1936), a former reader in physiology at Oxford
University who, as director of a research laboratory in Doncaster, had worked with
the mining industry in developing respirators against the toxic effects of mine
gases;10 and Herbert B. Baker (1862–1935), a professor of chemistry at Imperial
College. Both were dispatched to France to ﬁnd out what kind of gas had been used
and inspect the site of the ﬁrst gas attack. At St Omer, close to the general head-
quarters in France, they managed to identify the gas that had been used as chlorine
through the use of a school laboratory (Thorpe 1936, 525; also Foulkes 1934, 37).
For all concerned, it was clear that “immediate defensive measures were
required.”11 On their return to Britain, Haldane submitted a full report to Prime
Minister Herbert Asquith, while Baker briefed Lord Kitchener about the situation;
the latter told him to “do his damnedest” to ensure that Britain could soon retaliate
(ibid.).
Despite these bold declarations of intent there was considerable uncertainty
among members of the British government as to whether Germany had actually
contravened the terms of The Hague Declaration. On 26 April, Asquith told King
George V: “As the gases are apparently stored in and drawn from cylinders, and not
“projectiles,” the employment of them is not perhaps an infraction of the literal
terms of The Hague Convention.”12 Given that Germany was widely perceived as
having violated the spirit of the Declaration, however, and with pressure mounting
8Foulkes 1934 (19); also Carter (2000, 2), who misquotes French in this instance.
9Foulkes (1934, 19f); Harris and Paxman (1982, 5); Hobbs et al. (2007, 260). See also TNA,
WO142/241, correspondence between Sir John French and Lord Kitchener, 23–24 April 1915.
10For John S. Haldane see Douglas (1936); Sturdy (1987); Goodman (2008); Sturdy (2011); see
also Haldane (1925, 63) who recounts how his father was sent to France to identify the gas which
the Germans had used.
11TNA, WO188/802, p. 1.
12Hobbs et al. (2007, 260); TNA, CAB 37/127/40, Asquith to George V, 26 April 1915.
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on the War Ofﬁce to retaliate, the government knew that such legal sophistry would
have little truck with the British public.
Within days, after graphic accounts of gas casualties had been published by The
Times and other newspapers, anti-German sentiment reached fever pitch (SIPRI
1971, 231ff.). On 29 April, The Times commented:
The willful and systematic attempt to choke and poison our soldiers can have but one effect
upon the British people and upon all the non-German people of the earth. It will deepen our
indignation and our resolution, and it will ﬁll all races with a new horror of the German
name.13
On the same day, the Daily Mirror reported that the German military had again
used “asphyxiating gases” contrary to The Hague Declaration.14 In Germany,
meanwhile, gas warfare was portrayed as a modern weapon that was not only
lawful but humane, one that produced a “rapid end” rather than the misery resulting
from turning the German trenches “into a terrible hell.”15 A week later, on 7 May,
the sinking of the Lusitania off the coast of Ireland by a German U-boat, killing
1198 civilians on board, including American citizens, caused further international
outrage and turned public opinion ﬁrmly against Germany (see also Spiers 2010,
40). By portraying Germany as an “inhuman enemy,” and German soldiers as
barbaric criminals, hell-bent on committing atrocities against civilians by means of
poison gas and submarine warfare, and in flagrant violation of the rules of war,
Allied ofﬁcials managed to bring the United States into the conflict and justify, in
the eyes of the public, Britain’s retaliatory measures.
Germany’s premeditated gas attack initiated a Europe-wide chemical arms race
on an unprecedented scale, one in which there was “no time to worry about ethics”
(Harris and Paxman 1982, 21). Even neutral Netherlands got involved in the pro-
duction of hundreds of tons of poison gas (Van Bergen 2012). The German gas
attack “both inspired and provoked the British into retaliating with illegal weap-
onry, thereby opening the door to a virtually unlimited chemical warfare” (in Hobbs
et al. 2007, 261). After recovering from the initial shock, Britain and France wasted
little time in establishing large-scale programs for the testing of toxic substances,
and in preparing their armies for all-out technological warfare to be fought irre-
spective of any moral or legal boundaries. At the end of September 1915, British
forces attempted, but largely failed, to use poison gas in a major offensive at Loos in
Belgium (see Lloyd 2006). Despite months of preparation, the training of special
gas brigades, the employment of chemical experts, and the shipment and posi-
tioning of thousands of gas-ﬁlled cylinders along the front line, military planners
began to appreciate the enormous problems associated with chemical warfare. Gas
warfare was highly unpredictable, scientiﬁcally complex, and dependent on
prevalent weather and environmental conditions, and it quickly turned into a
nightmare for military strategists. Whereas the human cost of the Battle of Loos was
13The Times, 29 April 1915, p. 9; also UoK, Porton Archive, A201, WWI CW Media Articles.
14Daily Mirror, 29 April 1915.
15
Frankfurter Zeitung, 26 April 1915; quoted from SIPRI (1971, 232).
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substantial, strategic gains were almost negligible. The British had captured some
3000 German prisoners of war. Yet with over 50,000 British casualties, and hun-
dreds of troops gassed by their own side—after the toxic cloud had changed
direction—together with 3 miles of ground taken and then lost again, the military
agreed that the machinery of war needed to be modernized if Britain and her Empire
were to sustain a prolonged military campaign. Moreover, by using the newly
developed Stokes mortar, the sole purpose of which was the delivery of chemical
projectiles into and behind enemy lines, Britain had become the ﬁrst nation to
contravene the literal terms of The Hague Convention, and thus international law
(Hobbs et al. 2007, 260f; also Spiers 1986, 24).
3 Porton Down
At the end of 1915, ofﬁcials in the Ministry of Munitions concluded that the modern
war machine needed nothing less than a fully equipped, large-scale testing ground
to keep abreast of rapid developments in science, technology, and medicine.16 In
September, the Trench Warfare Department duly instructed the Scientiﬁc Advisory
Committee to ﬁnd and requisition a suitable “ground for experimental purposes.”17
A few months later, in early 1916, some 2886 acres of land near the villages of
Idmiston, Idmiston Down, and Porton, on the southern edge of Salisbury Plain in
Wiltshire, formed the basis of what came to be known as Porton Down.18
Porton rapidly expanded to take over 6200 acres of largely woodland and
farmland, accessible through a complex network of roads and a light railway that
interlinked the administrative headquarters, army huts, workshops, laboratories,
munitions depot, open-air testing station, and animal farm, a place teeming with
service personnel and civilian scientists working under the leadership of Porton’s
commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur W. Crossley, a Mancunian, who had made
his career as a chemist at King’s College London. During the war, Porton was
divided into four departments: the Commandant, the Division Ofﬁcer Royal
Engineers, the Works Department, and the Experimental Department. While the
Division Ofﬁcer Royal Engineers was responsible for the general upkeep of the
facility, the Works Department, line-managed by the Superintendent of
Experimental Grounds, carried out the construction work through civilian laborers.
By 1918, the Experimental Department was divided into six sections: the Chemical
Laboratory, the Anti-Gas Department, the Physiology Laboratory, the
Meteorological Station, the Experimental Battery RA, and the Experimental
16TNA, WO188/802, p. 1.
17TNA, WO142/264, Lt Col A.W. Crossley RE, ‘The Royal Engineers Experimental Station,
Porton’ (1919); also TNA, WO188/802, p. 1; Carter (2000, 3).
18TNA, WO142/264, Lt Col A.W. Crossley RE, “The Royal Engineers Experimental Station,
Porton” (1919), pp. 3f. Work at the Station is believed to have commenced on 7 March 1916 when
the ﬁrst ofﬁcer from the Royal Engineers reported for permanent duty.
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Company RE.19 As sign that Porton was there to stay, certainly for the duration of
the war, the organization soon saw the creation of more permanent laboratories,
photographic and meteorological units, barracks, and welfare facilities. By 1918,
Porton had become a large-scale research facility with over 900 members of staff,
many of them ofﬁcers, thirty-three women from the Queen Mary Army Auxiliary
Corps, who were employed as typists, and some 500 civilian workmen who
maintained the workshops and laboratories.20 At ﬁrst, much of the work was
directed towards developing new weapons of mass destruction.
In September 1916, the ﬁrst use of the Livens Projector, an ad hoc device
consisting of a steel tube, about 3 feet in length and 8 inches wide, dug into the
ground at an angle of 45° in batteries of twenty, and detonated remotely through an
electrical charge, opened a new chapter in gas warfare. It was no longer necessary
to rely on the right meteorological conditions: bombs containing 30 lb (15 kg) of
chemical agents, generally phosgene (CG), could be ﬁred directly into enemy lines,
resulting in high numbers of casualties and deaths. The power of the new weapon
lay in the number of projectiles that could be ﬁred simultaneously, sometimes more
than 1000 at a time.21 In April 1917, at the Battle of Arras, the British used the
Livens Projector for a full-scale, deadly attack. Although inexpensive and inaccu-
rate, with a range limited to one mile, it was an effective but also terrifying weapon
that served as a technological precursor to “multiple rocket launchers and… aircraft
cluster bombs” (Harris and Paxman 1982, 22). Gas shells, on the other hand, used
by Germany and France from 1916, required less preparation, offered greater tar-
geting precision, and were able to be ﬁred over longer distances. In Germany, the
symbols on the shell cases represented the different chemical agents: a white cross
stood for tear gas, a green cross for phosgene, and a yellow cross for mustard gas
(HS).22 With an estimated total of 66 million gas shells ﬁred during the war,
chemical warfare had turned into an ever-present threat for Allied and German
forces.
In December 1915, the German military used phosgene for the ﬁrst time, an
almost colorless and odorless gas, eighteen times more toxic than chlorine, which,
when inhaled, caused serious lung damage from excessive fluid accumulation, and
death within a few hours.23 Toxicologists called it an “inner drowning” of the lungs
Klee (1997, 269). Retaliating in June 1916, the Allies employed phosgene with
devastating effect during the battles of the Somme; by ﬁring 4000 gas-ﬁlled shells
19TNA, WO188/802, pp. 3, 10f; for Crossley see TNA, WO142/264, Lt Col A.W. Crossley RE,
“The Royal Engineers Experimental Station, Porton” (1919).
20TNA, WO188/802, p. 10; McCamley (2006, 97).
21TNA, WO188/802, p. 20.
22Mustard gas, or dichlorodiethyl sulphide, was code-named ‘H’ or ‘HS’. Lewisite, or chlorovinyl
dichloroarsine, was code-named ‘L’. For the exact chemical names of the code-named warfare
agents see Historical Survey (2006, 209).
23For the properties of phosgene as a chemical warfare agent see Marrs et al. (1996, 185–202).
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simultaneously, and thus releasing a total of 54 tons of gas over the target area, the
Allies wiped out hundreds, if not thousands, of German soldiers, horses, and wild
animals.
The close proximity of Porton’s laboratories to one another allowed scientists
and service ofﬁcers to conduct integrated research across disciplinary boundaries.
Except for a few scientists who wanted to protect their academic independence,
most researchers were given military ranks.24 Physiologists, chemists, pathologists,
meteorologists, and a range of technical and military experts all collaborated in
designing and executing experiments, both outdoors on the test range and indoors
in the laboratory, sampling station, or gas chamber; by sharing their research data,
they managed to improve protective clothing, diagnostic tools, and forms of
treatment. Sometimes, relevant expertise had to be brought in from the outside.
Porton’s ﬁrst respirator and gas tests, for instance, were conducted by civilian
rescue workers from Derbyshire, where mining accidents from gas explosions were
not uncommon (McCamley 2006, 97). Teamwork was an essential ingredient of
Porton’s developing research culture. It provided scientists and military personnel
with an incentive to join the establishment and work long, exhausting hours, late at
night, or during weekends. Porton’s collaborative “spirit and unity of purpose,” as
Crossley put it, strengthened their belief that they belonged to an exclusive group of
professionals who were tasked by the government to develop chemical weapon
technologies.25
New challenges brought about by modern chemical warfare also led to advances
at Porton in defensive technologies for both soldiers and civilians, for example in
the design and development of more efﬁcient respirators (Sturdy 1998). Realizing
that Allied respirators offered improved protection against certain gases, chlorine
and phosgene especially, German scientists developed ever more lethal and inca-
pacitating agents that attacked the body from the outside. Dichlorethyl sulphide, or
mustard gas as it became known in Britain because of its distinct garlicky,
mustard-like smell, attacked the skin, causing severe burns and blisters within a
couple of hours.26 If inhaled, mustard gas could cause serious inflammation of the
lungs, followed by a slow and painful death from asphyxiation. In Germany, the
agent was called “Lost” in recognition of the two scientists (Lommel and Steinkopf)
who synthesized it, and in France it was called “Ypérite” in reference to Germany’s
ﬁrst mustard gas attack in July 1917, when the military employed the agent to
deadly effect in the area around, yet again, the heavily embattled Ypres. The onset
of symptoms was delayed, and thousands of soldiers were unaware of having been
exposed to a toxic agent, yet developed severe blisters on their hands and neck, and
in armpits, groin, and buttocks. The blisters often became infected, leaving soldiers
24TNA, WO188/802, p. 3; see also Roughton (1949, 320).
25TNA, WO188/802, p. 8.
26Sulphur mustard (mustard gas) was ﬁrst synthesized in the mid nineteenth century and developed
as a chemical warfare agent during the First World War. For the chemical properties of sulphur
mustard see Marrs et al. (1996, 139–173).
Preparing for Poison Warfare: The Ethics and Politics … 85
totally incapacitated and in need of medical treatment. Impregnated leather gloves
and suits drenched in linseed oil provided some degree of protection, yet these
could be worn only temporarily. British scientists quickly came to realize that the
complex scientiﬁc problems linked to mustard gas, and the means to protect the
human skin from it, needed to be studied in great detail after the end of hostilities.
As the “King” or “Queen” of war gases (Tucker 2006, 19; Klee 1997, 269; Groehler
1989, 72), contaminating Allied troops and their equipment for prolonged periods
of time, mustard gas stood at the forefront of Porton’s research until the end of the
Second World War.
4 Servants of the Realm
The generation of civilian scientists and service ofﬁcers associated with Porton
during the Great War had grown up in Victorian and Edwardian Britain, came from
middle-class or more modest social backgrounds, studied at elite universities such
as Cambridge, Oxford, or University College London, and occasionally married
into the British establishment. Porton’s origin as a defense establishment during the
Great War was intricately connected with a generation of male researchers who
were driven by a deep-seated desire for advancement and social prestige, an
emerging “intellectual aristocracy” with strong social and professional bonds,
determined to unlock the secrets of the world through science and experiment and
thus realize their visionary ideas of modern society (see also Sturdy 2011). Those
who believed in the power of science were men such as Lieutenant Colonel Charles
Lovatt Evans (1884–1968) who, according to a friend, “possessed the great qual-
ities of some of the most zealous and distinguished of the Victorians, who
accomplished their life’s work by an immense capacity for hard work and a burning
zeal for achievement.”27 At Porton, Lovatt Evans’ colleagues included the
Cambridge physiologist Joseph Barcroft. Despite his Quaker upbringing, Barcroft
felt the need to contribute to the war effort after Germany’s premeditated gas attack.
In January 1917, prompted by the devastating effects of Germany’s mustard gas
attack, Porton established a permanent laboratory for physiological tests on humans
at nearby Boscombe Down Farm.28 The department seems to have been limited at
ﬁrst to a single hut, measuring 30 feet by 15 feet, which was converted into an ofﬁce
and physiological laboratory. To ensure close liaison with the Royal Army Medical
Corps (RAMC), medical ofﬁcers were attached to Porton.29 Conditions were
27BMJ, Obituary, Charles Lovatt Evans, 3 (1968), 5619, pp. 684–685.
28The decision was taken by the Chemical Advisory Committee under Barcroft’s leadership: TNA,
WO142/264, Lt Col A.W. Crossley RE, “The Royal Engineers Experimental Station, Porton”
(1919), pp. 11ff; also TNA, WO188/802, p. 7; Sturdy (1998, 70).
29During the First World War, Rudolph Peters worked as the medical ofﬁcer under A.E. Kent, who
was in charge of offensive chemical warfare on sections of the front controlled by the British First
Army; TNA, WO188/802, p. 7.
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austere, to say the least, with Peters not only living in the hut but taking his bath in a
round tin on the floor of the post-mortem room where the animals were dissected
(Thompson and Ogston 1983, 499). Other accounts mention a better-equipped
outﬁt: an old brick building, laboratories, ofﬁces, and even a gas chamber for
various animal experiments (Garner 2003, 138). Whether staff deliberately played
down the existing working conditions to highlight their scientiﬁc achievements is
difﬁcult to tell in retrospect, yet what seems to be certain is that facilities were
relatively simple, even by the standards of the day. Under Barcroft’s leadership, and
in collaboration with British universities, for example with Cambridge’s Chemistry
Department, itself engaged in the preparation of toxic agents under the leadership of
Sir William Jackson Pope (1870–1939), these men set out to investigate the effects
of chlorine, phosgene, adamsite (DM), an arsenical irritant, and mustard gas in
experimental gas chambers and to analyze the results in improvised laboratories.30
Research had at ﬁrst concentrated on assessing toxic agents for their ability to
kill within forty-eight hours, though experts soon discovered the “casualty pro-
ducing effects” of certain gases. Chemical warfare, they realized, was not so much
about killing people but about incapacitating them for the duration of combat
activity. Toxicity trials had revealed that the length of exposure to certain sub-
stances, and their concentration, were key in determining the degree to which
agents were harmless or dangerous. By the end of the war, Barcroft’s team had
examined the toxicity and the possible remedies for 160 substances, including
mustard gas and lewisite, which became known among Allied propagandists as the
“dew of death,” a description that overemphasized its actual killing potential.31
Although Porton encountered difﬁculties in retaining some of the civilian sci-
entists after the war, with men such as Barcroft, Lovatt Evans, and Starling
returning to their university positions, often as FRS, almost all of them continued to
conduct research which was informed by their work on chemical warfare.32 In the
interwar period, and thereafter, the “Old Portonians” formed a closely knit group of
experimental scientists who continued to have close links to the British defense
community at Porton Down.33 This was the generation of military men and civilian
researchers for whom the experience of the Great War, and of tens of thousands of
gassed soldiers, marked a watershed in their determination to prepare the country
30TNA, WO188/802, p. 15; see also Gibson (1941, 321f.); for Pope see also IWM, Photographic
Collection, Portrait W. J. Pope (1870–1939).
31For a history of lewisite see Vilensky (2005).
32For Lovatt Evans’ subsequent professional career see WL, PP/CLE/A.9, Jodrell Chair; PP/CLE/
A.11, Service at Porton Experimental Station, Wiltshire, during the Second World War.
Miscellaneous Correspondence re. Secondment and Service. For Barcroft’s postwar career as a
Reader in Physiology at Cambridge University see Roughton (1949). During the early 1920 s,
Peters worked with F.G. Hopkins, Malcolm Dixon, and J.B.S. Haldane at the Balfour Laboratory
at Cambridge University; see Peters (1959).
33Lt (later Maj) J.A. Sadd continued work as a senior civilian scientist at Porton until the 1950 s.
Lt Col W.A. Salt, Lt Col A.E. Kent, Capt S.J. Steadman, and Lt A.C. Peacock all worked at Porton
Down after the Great War.
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for a future war, protect the army and civilians from the anticipated fallout, and
supply the military with the means and methods to retaliate. On the eve of the
Second World War, many of those who had fought in the previous war were ready
to recommence research on chemical warfare to protect the United Kingdom and
her allies.
5 Crisis of Legitimacy
Following the Armistice in November 1918, the victorious powers envisaged the
creation of a demilitarized and largely peaceful world, free from violence and
weapons of mass destruction. Undermined by feelings of revenge and demands for
reparations, their vision got off to a difﬁcult start. Under the Versailles Treaty,
notorious for its humiliating terms, the Allies not only annexed territory, disarmed
the German army, and extracted material resources from a traumatized, politically
divided society that was barely coming to terms with military defeat, but also forced
the government to admit sole responsibility for the war (Kershaw 1998, 136). To
destroy any future chemical warfare capability, Germany was strictly prohibited,
under Article 171, from using, producing, or importing chemical agents, including
“asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids.”34
Although far from homogenous, public opinion became a powerful force in
shaping the international community’s protracted disarmament negotiations.35 In
1918, representatives of the British medical profession called for a ban on chemical
warfare in The Times, describing it as an “unclean,” uncontrollable, and malignant
weapon of war which ought to be abolished.36 Elsewhere, doctors and nurses
employed by the armed forces protested against their involvement in this type of
warfare. Some have argued that the interwar debate simply resulted from a “clash”
between the wartime practicalities of using chemical weapons and the experienced
or perceived horrors among “victims and observers alike,” but this overlooks quite
speciﬁc economic, political, and scientiﬁc factors as well as cultural traditions that
shaped the discourse at a national level (see Van Bergen 2012). In the United
States, where the chemical industries, like their British counterparts, launched a
major publicity offensive, chemical warfare became a matter of domestic politics.
Chemical warfare meant big business at a time of great economic uncertainty and
guaranteed the employment of thousands of ofﬁcers lecturing in US chemical
34
“The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or
devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany”
(Treaty of Versailles, Article 171). Tucker (2006, 21); Hobbs et al. (2007, 278f.). Britain’s pro-
posal during the Versailles Treaty negotiations for full disclosure of Germany’s wartime manu-
facturing processes was seen as an attempt at economic espionage, and rejected by the United
States; see also SIPRI (1971, 235f.).
35See SIPRI (1971, 231–267), Chap. 3: “Popular Attitudes towards CBW”, 1919–1939.
36
The Times, 29 November 1918, p. 6.
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warfare (CW) training facilities.37 In a bid to improve chemical warfare pre-
paredness and secure the postwar continuity of the Chemical Warfare Service
(CWS), founded in mid 1918, stakeholders and major suppliers from the building,
mining, and engineering trades, who advocated a more isolationist policy, became
involved in a campaign to frustrate international disarmament negotiations. The
proposed abolition of the CWS, in particular, threatened the existence of small,
specialized companies supplying the US chemical warfare industry, which needed
to adjust to peacetime conditions, for example through the sale of tear gas to law
enforcement agencies. While Edgewood Arsenal highlighted the “relative
humaneness” of toxic agents compared to high explosives in specially designed
publications, engineering ﬁrms promoted their latest airtight steel tanks. Elsewhere,
the producers of metal ores advertised their ability to deliver “gas by the ton.”38
Yet the campaign also fuelled public anxieties against possible airborne attacks
with toxic agents, and strengthened the resolve of organizations such as the British
Association for the Advancement of Science and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) to protest against the use of poison gas in 1918 and call for an
absolute ban on chemical warfare (SIPRI 1971, 239–242; Hobbs et al. 2007, 280;
Van Bergen 2012). Having been criticized by the belligerents for abandoning its
principle of impartiality, the ICRC subsequently took a more “neutral” position and
“waged war on gas warfare” by campaigning for the improvement of defensive
capabilities in the late 1920s in order to make the use of chemical warfare agents
unworkable; there was even an ICRC-funded prize for innovative developments in
the ﬁeld of chemical defense. Anti-militarist groups and paciﬁsts, however, became
increasingly hostile towards the ICRC for viewing chemical weapons as an
inevitable reality of future wars. In the aftermath of the Second World War, and in
light of the Holocaust, the ICRC’s stated policy of impartiality and non-interference
became the subject of heated controversy, which has continued ever since.
Another major organization involved in shaping public opinion on the subject of
chemical and biological warfare was the League of Nations. In the 1920s, it played
a leading role in negotiating international agreements for the limitation and
reduction of chemical weapons, and in prohibiting their use in future wars. Founded
in 1920, the League of Nations was ﬁrmly committed to comprehensive disarma-
ment, weapons control, and conflict resolution through international cooperation.
Yet political setbacks during the League’s formative years placed the United States
in a powerful negotiating position. Held in Washington DC from November 1921
to February 1922, the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, organized by the
United States to establish a new security framework in the Paciﬁc area, sought, inter
alia, a legally binding resolution for the prohibition of chemical weapons. During
the negotiations, because of behind-the-scenes tensions between experts and
37CHF, Archive Collection, GB98.09, Williams—Miles Reprint Collection, William Williams,
Notebook: US Gas School, 1918.
38CHF, The Edgewood Arsenal, Special Edition of Chemical Warfare, vol. 1, no. 5 (March 1919);
for the origins of the CWS see Brophy and Fisher (1959); Ede (2011).
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politicians about the real and imagined power of chemical agents and the ability to
control them, careful management was required to preserve a united front (SIPRI
1971, 242ff.). Article 5 of the Washington Agreement prohibited the “use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, or materials, of
devices,” such use having been “justly condemned by the general opinion of the
civilized world.”39 Despite reservations by Britain and France, which prevented the
resolution from coming into force, the Washington Agreement marked an important
milestone that galvanized public opinion and political power to work towards an
international chemical weapons ban.40
Clearly affected by the international climate, Porton Down suffered a crisis of
legitimacy after it transpired that Britain’s chemical warfare program no longer
enjoyed unconditional political and public support.41 At ﬁrst, almost all research
activities ceased. Parliamentary questions were now being raised about Porton’s
annual cost to the taxpayer.42 Reflecting public concerns about a substantially
weakened economy, the MP Hugh Morrison queried in 1920 whether the gov-
ernment would not be well advised to “have it [Porton] closed down.” In his
cautious reply, which avoided revealing that the total cost of the establishment had
been around £90,000 in 1919–1920,43 Winston Churchill told the House of
Commons that the government aimed to keep the experimental facility open “until
the attitude of the League of Nations to chemical warfare is deﬁned.”44 In March
1922, prompted by the Washington Agreement, the government came under
renewed pressure, but insisted that it “would be failing in its duty if it failed to take
all possible steps which might be necessary to protect the Forces of the Crown and
the inhabitants of the country against gas attacks in time of war.”45
39Article 5 of the Washington Agreement stated: “The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or
other gases, and all analogous liquids, or materials, of devices, having been justly condemned by
the general opinion of the civilized world, and a prohibition of such use having been declared in
treaties to which a majority of the civilized powers are parties; now to the end that this prohibition
shall be universally accepted as a part of international law, binding alike the conscience and
practice of nations, the signatory powers declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound
thereby between themselves, and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.” See https://
ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-search.nsf/content.xsp.
40Whereas the British representative pointed out that it is “impossible to prevent a nation bent upon
Chemical Warfare from making preparations in peacetime, no matter what the rules of war may
be,” the French Government reserved the right “to act in accordance with the circumstances” if an
enemy refused to give a guarantee not “to use poison gas”; TNA, WO188/802, p. 48; Tucker
(2006, 21); Hobbs et al. (2007, 280).
41Subordinated to the Chemical Warfare Department, Porton shared responsibility for chemical
warfare research with a number of supervisory committees and organizations, including the
Chemical Warfare Committee and university research facilities.
42Hansard, HC Debate, vol. 122 c60 W, Experimental Ground, Porton, 1 December 1919.
43For the total cost of Porton Down between 1919 and 1924 see Hansard, HC Debate, vol.
181 c1108, Chemical Warfare Research Department, 10 March 1925.
44Hansard, HC Debate, vol. 130 c1063, Chemical Experimental Ground, 15 June 1920.
45Hansard, HC Debate, vol. 152 c984 W, Asphyxiating Gas (Washington Treaty), 27 March 1922.
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Unbeknown to the public, the Cabinet had accepted the recommendations of the
Holland Committee in May 1920 to expedite chemical warfare research and reor-
ganize Porton Down. Made up of experienced military and civilian experts, the
committee had concluded that the “safety of the Empire” could not be left to
chance: “A nation which is unprepared for gas warfare lays itself open to sudden
and irretrievable disaster.”46 Separating defensive from offensive research was seen
to be impossible, because one could not be understood without the other.
Recommended changes to the organization involved a reconstituted Chemical
Warfare Committee, the attachment of experts to the Director of Military
Intelligence, the consolidation of “research, design and supply” under the control of
the Ministry of Supply, and improved liaison between Porton’s scientists and the
armed services, a subject which had caused some considerable controversy during
the war.47 It was recommended that Porton’s staff should, in future, be composed
“partly of soldiers and partly of men of science,” the latter to be of “high standing”
and “independent of outside inspection and criticism.”48 To attract scientists of the
highest caliber, and because staff sacriﬁced parts of their careers and occasionally
risked their own health in the pursuit of knowledge, the authorities were asked to
offer substantial inducements in the form of salaries, security of tenure, pensions,
and the right to publish.49 Largely oblivious to stringent cuts to the military budget
during a period of economic austerity, the committee weighed Porton’s “consid-
erable” running costs on the basis of national security considerations. It also
believed that Porton’s discoveries were likely to have scientiﬁc and commercial
value that would transform the organization into a “very valuable national asset.”
At the same time military interference with Porton’s activities needed to be kept
to a minimum, provided the General Staff could “indicate the general lines” which
appeared to be the most promising. The tension between the ability to conduct
independent research, free from external pressures, and the practical demands by
the military to defend the country against potential chemical warfare attacks,
together with the need for a credible retaliatory capability, have characterized
Porton ever since.
Close liaison between Porton’s scientists and expert networks elsewhere in
Britain and overseas, essential in maintaining a ﬁrst-class research facility, was to
be assured through the Chemical Warfare Committee, which was broadly
46UoK, Porton Archive, A207, “Report of the Committee on Chemical Warfare Organization”, 7
July 1919, p. 5; also TNA, WO188/802, p. 30.
47Subordinating ﬁeld trials to the military requirements of war had, according to some, slowed
down, if not inhibited, Britain’s chemical warfare program during the Great War; UoK, Porton
Archive, A207, ‘Report of the Committee on Chemical Warfare Organization’, 7 July 1919,
pp. 3ff; TNA, WO188/802, pp. 13, 17.
48UoK, Porton Archive, A207, “Report of the Committee on Chemical Warfare Organization”, 7
July 1919, p. 5.
49UoK, Porton Archive, A207, “Report of the Committee on Chemical Warfare Organization”, 7
July 1919, p. 5; TNA, WO188/802, pp. 30f.
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representative of the wider scientiﬁc, military, and business community.50 To
ensure the coordinated production of toxic agents, including those for testing
purposes at Porton, the committee recommended the creation of a state-controlled
factory for chemical warfare products at Sutton Oak, near St Helens in Lancashire,
which later became the Chemical Defence Research Establishment (see Carter and
Pearson 1996, 60f; Carter 2000, 52f.) A representative of Porton liaised with
members of the committee about planned ﬁeld trials. It was this coordinated
approach to chemical warfare through an external body of experts and stakeholders
that other nations, the United States and Canada especially, began to emulate.
6 Collaboration
On a bilateral level, Britain and the United States joined forces in developing
offensive and defensive chemical warfare capabilities that required the sharing of
information and resources. In 1918, after the American Expeditionary Force
(AEF) sustained disproportionately high numbers of chemical warfare casualties
due to an inadequate level of preparedness, the US Army attached liaison ofﬁcers to
Porton to keep abreast of Britain’s advances in chemical warfare work, a tradition
which continued thereafter.51 Britain’s scientists, on the other hand, developed
close links with their counterparts at Edgewood Arsenal, near Baltimore, Maryland,
which became the United States’ headquarters for chemical warfare research and
development (Chemical Corps Association 1948, 14ff.). Given the exclusivity of
the ﬁeld, together with the need to preserve the utmost secrecy, research networks
which had been established during and after the First World War were central in
creating a long-term system of bilateral, and later tripartite, cooperation on chemical
warfare between the Allied powers.
Still unresolved questions about the legitimacy of chemical warfare, together
with the widespread condemnation of toxic agents as a means of warfare, turned
intelligence sharing between Britain and the United States into a sensitive issue
requiring a clear understanding about conﬁdentiality arrangements and levels of
secrecy. By assigning the highest security classiﬁcation to chemical and biological
warfare matters, and by avoiding the publication of details that could inform other
50In 1920, members of the Chemical Warfare Committee included: Joseph Barcroft (professor of
physiology, Cambridge University), A.W. Crossley (former Commandant Porton and Director of
the Cotton Industry Research Association), C.G. Douglas (physiologist, Oxford), Harold Hartley
(chemist, Oxford), H. Levinstein (representative of Levinstein Limited, chemical manufacturers),
Sir William Pope (professor of chemistry, Cambridge University), Jocelyn F. Thorpe (professor of
organic chemistry at Imperial College and representative of the Department of Scientiﬁc and
Industrial Research), A.M. Tyndall (professor of physics, Bristol University); see TNA, WO188/
802, pp. 32ff.
51TNA, WO188/802, p. 11.
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countries about the nature and extent of the work undertaken, Britain attempted to
ensure that its expanding chemical warfare program would not become public
knowledge.52
In addition, Britain was outsourcing certain types of research, some of it
offensive in nature, to British-controlled laboratories overseas to deflect public
attention from its expanding chemical warfare program.53 Subsidiary research
facilities in India and Australia, established in the 1920s, allowed British scientists
to investigate the effect of chemical warfare agents under speciﬁc climatic condi-
tions and among different population groups. Between 1921 and 1924, one of
Porton’s ofﬁcers, Lieutenant Colonel W.A. Salt, ran the Military Chemical
Laboratory in Dehra Dun in India, which conducted high-altitude and smoke trials
to test different types of respirators suitable for bearded Sikhs.54 Porton’s service
personnel and physiological staff also served as instructors to the Indian Chemical
Warfare School in Begaum, a center of the armed forces for the British Raj. In
1929, the British authorities set up a Chemical Warfare Research Establishment in
Rawalpindi, in the Punjab, staffed by scientists and ofﬁcers from Porton, who
engaged in smoke trials for the protection of bridges and other strategic sites.55 To
forge better relations, Indian representatives were invited to Britain for an appre-
ciation of the power of chemical warfare. Around the same time, Britain established
closer links with the Australian Chemical Warfare Board to study the effects of
tropical and subtropical conditions on chemical warfare, attached Australian,
Canadian, and South African representatives to Porton, and organized chemical
warfare courses in the Dominions. In some cases, Porton helped Allied govern-
ments to deal with civil unrest by providing defensive technologies and chemical
agents; in 1930, for example, Porton supplied South Africa with specially devel-
oped bombs ﬁlled with tear gas which the government employed against opposition
groups. Most of Porton’s activities overseas were strictly classiﬁed, not only to
protect existing expertise but also to preserve Britain’s political credibility in
ongoing disarmament talks. At an international level, though, and in public, the
subject of chemical warfare was openly discussed.56
52UoK, Porton Archive, A205, Porton Experiments 1920 s, Atkisson to Chief of CWS,
Washington, 15 July 1924.
53TNA, WO188/802, pp. 86–90.
54TNA, WO188/802, pp. 86ff.
55TNA, WO188/802, p. 88; see also Evans (2007).
56A pamphlet published by the League of Nations noted that “everywhere except Germany,
experiments in Chemical Warfare openly proceed […]. It will not necessarily inflict more pain than
high explosive, but will tend to aggravate the burden of war upon the civilian population”; TNA,
WO188/802, p. 49.
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7 The Geneva Protocol
The “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” known as the Geneva
Protocol, and modeled on Article 5 of the Washington Agreement, outlawed the
employment of chemical and biological weapons. However, it failed to establish an
international veriﬁcation and enforcement system, and exposed deep-seated dis-
agreements about disarmament. The United States was opposed to prohibiting the
use of tear gas in war on the grounds that it was also used by police forces against
civilians in peacetime, especially as a weapon for riot control, and they refused to
ratify the Protocol until 1975. The French and the British were likewise reluctant to
go ahead and ratify, and this further limited the scope of the Protocol to a
“no-ﬁrst-use” agreement (Hobbs et al. 2007, 286f.).57
Questions relating to chemical and bacteriological weapons routinely surfaced in
the discussions of the Preparatory Commission for the World Disarmament
Conference58 that opened under the chairmanship of the former British Foreign
Secretary and Labour politician Arthur Henderson (1863–1935) in Geneva in
February 1932. Preliminary meetings had highlighted the relative ease with which a
chemical industry could be adapted to the production of toxic agents, and their
potential delivery from the air. Secret intelligence further suggested that almost all
countries that had signed up to the Geneva Protocol were pursuing an offensive
chemical weapons capability.59 It therefore came as little surprise that the negoti-
ations were beset by disagreements over what constituted “offensive” and “defen-
sive” weapons and by Germany’s belligerent posturing. Britain’s high-proﬁle role
during the negotiations left senior ofﬁcials back in London distinctly nervous about
granting permission for human experiments involving chemical warfare agents. By
the time Britain proposed a draft convention at the World Disarmament Conference
in March 1933, two months after Hitler’s accession as Reich Chancellor, it had
become clear that Europe, if not the world, was faced with an extraordinarily brutal
military dictatorship which had no intention of settling international disputes by
peaceful means. The talks collapsed after Germany withdrew ﬁrstly from the
Geneva World Disarmament Conference and then, in October 1933, from the
League of Nations. Breathing tests with toxic substances remained prohibited until
the outbreak of war in 1939 changed the ethics of human experimentation at Porton.
Whereas some have hailed the Geneva Protocol as “the high-water mark of the
hostility of public opinion towards CW,” others have stressed the role of the
international community in reasserting its authority after the contravention of The
57See also Hobbs et al. (2007, 255–295). For the use of tear gas in dealing with civil disturbances
in the United States see SIPRI (1971, 270).
58The title of the conference was “Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.”
59TNA, WO188/802, p. 49; see also the debate in parliament about Britain’s “offensive” and
“defensive” chemical warfare capability; Hansard, HC Debate, vol. 272 cc811–12, Chemical
Warfare, 30 November 1932.
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Hague Declaration during the First World War (SIPRI 1971, 247; Hobbs et al.
2007, 287ff.). Irrespective of whether chemical weapons had been “politicized”
before, during, or after the war, whether politicians had responded to public
opinion, or whether chemical weapons themselves were inhumane and immoral, the
Geneva Protocol established a new international law which not only prohibited the
use of chemical and biological weapons, but which, perhaps more importantly,
most nations perceived to be obligatory.
8 Foreboding
Far from being a “sudden outburst” of idealism, the Geneva Protocol was the
League’s “attempt to meet a grave and increasing practical danger, viz., the inse-
curity of European peace and, resulting therefrom, the rise of a new competition in
armaments” (Hobbs et al. 2007, 288f.).60 In the context of emerging European
dictatorships, this constituted a realistic assessment. Since the early 1920s, the
German Reichswehr and the Soviet Red Army had been involved in clandestine
military operations that included weapons development and arms trade. Although
the manufacture of chemical weapons was banned under the Versailles Treaty, and
outlawed by national legislation, Germany’s chemical industry and the military
were organizing shipments of poison gas from Soviet Russia. The accidental release
of phosgene from a storage tank in Hamburg in 1928 alerted the international
community to the fact that Germany was flouting the Versailles Treaty. By the early
1930s, Germany’s rearmament program had reached such alarming proportions that
another war in Europe seemed a realistic possibility, especially in the context of a
Hitler-led regime.
In the context of the Europe-wide rearmament programs that preceded the
outbreak of the Second World War, issues relating to chemical warfare became
absorbed into debates about national security. Almost all European governments,
including the Soviet Union and Britain, employed the threat of chemical weapons
as a way of accelerating the introduction of comprehensive civil defense measures.
Whereas Soviet citizens received anti-gas drills in simulated gas attacks on
Leningrad and Kiev in 1928, the British public was exposed to exaggerated reports
about the power of chemical weapons. One estimate predicted that all men, women,
and children in Central London would be killed if a large poison gas bomb were
dropped onto Piccadilly Circus; another estimated the death of all Londoners if 40
tons of newly developed toxic agents were released. Italy’s widely reported, but at
ﬁrst vehemently denied, use of chemical weapons in Ethiopia in 1935 and 1936,
which involved the alleged use of mustard gas bombs against civilians and hospital
patients, led to demands for sanctions by the League of Nations and increased the
60See also TNA, PRO30/69/1273, “Some Questions on the Geneva Protocol” (1925).
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value of chemical weapons as a propaganda tool among anti-fascist groups.61 In the
Middle East, the British government pursued a dual strategy of attempting to broker
a political settlement in conjunction with providing practical support; Porton’s
experimental ofﬁcer was dispatched to Egypt, Aden, the Sudan, and Palestine to
advise military ofﬁcials about defensive chemical warfare technologies.62 The
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 led to a ﬁerce propaganda war over
chemical warfare, with insurgents and government forces each alleging the enemy’s
use of poison gas. In the context of Britain’s appeasement policy, ofﬁcial support
was limited to public condemnation and the supply of respirators to aid the Spanish
government. Although the Spanish military had shown few moral qualms in
employing chemical weapons against Moroccans in the mid 1920s, reports con-
ﬁrming the use of chemical agents during the Spanish Civil War never materialized,
apart from one incident involving the alleged use of tear gas (SIPRI 1971, 258ff.;
Balfour 2002, 123–156). At the same time, intelligence from Germany and the
Soviet Union suggested increased chemical and biological warfare activities.63
Retaliatory preparations were likewise set in train. In 1936, in addition to
existing facilities which produced 20 tons of mustard gas per week, the Committee
of Imperial Defence ordered the development of a pilot plant with an estimated
output of 50 tons per week for the production of a new chemical warfare agent,
code-named HT, better known as Runcol.64 Less than a year later, over 5 million
respirators were reported to be in storage for a national emergency. Additional
storage facilities for defensive equipment were set up in Canada and South Africa.65
Following the notorious Munich Agreement of September 1938, and Hitler’s
invasion of what was left of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the government dis-
tributed over 30 million respirators. Two years into the war, Britain had at its
disposal a total of almost 4 million children’s respirators and anti-gas helmets alone
(Grayzel 2012, 250; Harris and Paxman 1982, 107f.).66 Here was an aggressor who
warranted the mobilization of all resources in preparation for a potential chemical
warfare attack.
Shortly before the outbreak of war, research on chemical and biological warfare
accelerated at all levels. Through liaison with the ARP Subcommittee, Porton
became an integral part of Britain’s civil defense planning with increased access to
military intelligence and hardware.67 In 1935, an RAF “Special Duty Flight” was
put on permanent stand-by to allow scientists to study the effects of airborne gas
61TNA, WO188/802, p. 51; Grayzel (2012, 181f.).
62TNA, WO188/802, p. 89.
63TNA, WO188/802, p. 51; see also Balmer (2001).
64TNA, CAB4/24, Committee of Imperial Defence, “Policy with Regard to the Possible Use of
Gas as a Retaliatory Measure in War”, 8 July 1936; also Historical Survey (2006, 209).
65TNA, WO188/802, p. 89.
66Sources have recently come to light, however, which suggest that the majority of gas masks
produced for civilians and service personnel contained signiﬁcant amounts of asbestos; see
Schmidt (2015, 69ff.).
67TNA, WO188/802, p. 44.
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attacks on the Porton range (ibid.). Research and development at Porton included
the design of respirators for humans and animals, detector and decontamination
devices, ﬁltration units for ships, buildings (including air raid shelters) and armored
vehicles, methods to prevent toxic gas from inﬁltrating the London Underground
and government buildings, impregnated garments to protect against speciﬁc agents,
and the testing of anti-gas ointments. To assist the RAF in assessing wind condi-
tions on the ground or the Royal Navy in battleship protection, Porton conducted
research on smoke, including smoke curtain installations and assessments about the
relation between screening effects and meteorological conditions.68 Offensive work
involved chemical shell and aircraft gas bombs, ground mustard gas bombs to
contaminate whole areas, gas-ﬁlled rocket launchers, gas-spraying devices, toxic
smoke (arsenical) weapons, or substitute agents (“pseudo gases”) to mislead the
enemy.69 Hand in hand with the rapid expansion of Porton’s areas of responsibil-
ities in the interwar period came the expansion of its research staff, who forged
closer links with subsidiary research facilities in India and later Canada.70 The
number of scientists afﬁliated with Porton during these years is testimony to the
way in which the government managed to integrate research and development into
the planning process for future military operations (McCamley 2006, 100).
By the late 1920s, the notion of gas warfare and its associated imagery had become
a powerful part of the collective memory of the European public. This applied
especially to First World War memorials. Built in 1929 on Belgian soil to com-
memorate the suffering of thousands of victims of asphyxiation in the ﬁrst chemical
attack in modern history, the Steenstraate gas memorial blamed the German military
for this act of inhumanity, which is why the occupying German forces duly destroyed
it in 1941 (Jacobs 1996, 46–48; see also Goebel and Connelly 2017, forthcoming).
9 Ethical Relativism
At the start of hostilities, Britain, France, and Germany pledged to abide by the
Geneva Protocol, yet none of the parties trusted that the agreement would be
observed “a moment longer than is necessary” (Harris and Paxman 1982, 83, 107).
Britain anticipated the use of chemical weapons by one or more of the belligerents.
68That smoke could be used as an effective weapon of war had been recognized as early as April
1915, days before Germany’s ﬁrst gas attack, when Winston Churchill as the First Lord of the
Admiralty had commissioned a number of “wonderful smoke-making experiments”; Churchill
(1923, 84f.); also Carter (2000, 53f.).
69TNA, WO188/802, pp. 53–66.
70Whereas the scientiﬁc staff had risen from 23 to 51 between 1922 and 1925, it had more than
doubled to 120 by 1936/37. By 1938, Porton had a total of 152 researchers working on all aspects
of defensive and offensive chemical warfare. The annual “Dominion Day” event, for example,
organized by Porton between 1937 and 1942, offered visitors insight into Porton’s research and
development program; TNA, WO188/802, pp. 41, 89.
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Millions of leaflets were distributed to all households and the BBC was on stand-by
to broadcast pre-arranged gas warnings in the event of gas attacks. Following
Hitler’s Blitzkrieg campaign through the Low Countries and the surrender of France
in May 1940, the threat of invasion by German forces loomed large in the minds of
British ofﬁcials in London.
By 1944, four years into an extraordinarily brutal and costly war, Allied military
planners were growing increasingly concerned about the potential use of chemical
agents by Axis forces, fearing the employment of these weapons in a desperate,
last-ditch attempt to hold their positions. The large-scale decommissioning of sci-
entiﬁc experts, who began to return to their prewar posts, added to a renewed crisis
at military headquarters. Military planners warned about a lack of vigilance and the
scaling down of chemical warfare preparedness which could cost Allied forces
dearly in the closing stages of the war. At Porton, and elsewhere, researchers were
likewise determined to ﬁnish the job at hand.71
At the same time, the authorities continued incessantly to prepare servicemen
and civilians for the Allied invasion which might involve or trigger the use of gas
warfare. In May, Porton carried out large-scale chemical warfare exercises in
conjunction with beach-head operations by service and civilian authorities; at
around the same time, scientists from Porton came to the conclusion that the use of
mustard gas was likely to have a “big potential in the subjugation” of Japanese
forces on the Paciﬁc islands thousands of miles to the east.72 With millions of
soldiers and civilians killed and injured, families and children displaced, buildings
burnt, and entire cities destroyed, there was little appetite among senior Allied
ofﬁcials to uphold standards of medical ethics and international morality if the end
of combat operations would be delayed as a result. Mustard gas and phosgene were
Churchill’s chemical weapons of choice to attack deep within the German heartland
and cause maximum casualties and mayhem, but also as weapons which could
legitimately be deployed to defend Britain’s beaches, ports and industry against an
invading army. His retrospective assessment, made after the war, was that the
Germans “would have used terror, and we were prepared to go all lengths” (Harris
and Paxman 1982, 110; also Parker 1996, 49).
On 6 July 1944, one month after the D-Day landing of Allied forces in Normandy,
Churchill returned once again to the subject by telling the House of Commons that the
introduction of the German “flying bomb” raised some “grave questions” about the
future conduct of the war. On the same day, dissatisﬁed by the negative assessment of
the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) on the use of gas warfare as a retaliatory measure, he
informed his Chiefs of Staff of his intention to employ chemical weapons if it were a
matter of “life or death” for Britain or if it would shorten the war by a year:
It may be several weeks or even months before I shall ask you to drench Germany with
poison gas, and if we do it, let us do it one hundred per cent. In the meanwhile, I want the
71WL, PP/CLE/A.11, Lovatt Evans papers, Hill to Lovatt Evans, 24 April 1944; Lovatt Evans to
Hill, 27 April 1944.
72TNA, WO188/802, p. 112.
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matter studied in cold blood by sensible people and not by that particular set of
psalm-singing uniformed defeatists which one runs across now here now there. Pray
address yourself to this. It is a big thing and can only be discarded for a big reason. I shall of
course have to square Uncle Joe [Joseph Stalin] and the President [Franklin D. Roosevelt],
but you need not bring this into your calculations at the present time. Just try to ﬁnd out
what it is like on its merits.73
Churchill considered it to be “absurd” to worry about the “morality on this topic”
since all parties had used chemical weapons during the First World War. Whereas
the bombing of large cities had formerly been regarded as a war crime, it was now
done by the Axis and Allied forces on a day-to-day basis, he argued. Attempting to
downplay any moral concerns of his senior military advisers, he noted: “It is simply
a question of fashion changing as she [sic] does between long and short skirts for
women” (ibid.). For the Prime Minister, the Geneva Protocol outlawing the use of
poison gas was of no relevance if the existence of British realm were at stake.
Although Allied forces appeared to possess the capability, Churchill’s senior
military advisers stopped short of recommending the start of chemical warfare oper-
ations.74 The Chiefs of Staff nonetheless expressed a high degree of conﬁdence in
respect of the state of Allied readiness to initiate chemical warfare operations. By
1944, British and American stocks located in Britain were deemed sufﬁcient, they
said, to produce a “formidable scale of gas attack on Germany during the early and
most important phase after a decision has been taken to employ gas.”75 Britain alone
had produced a total of 40,719 tons of mustard gas and 14,042 tons of phosgene and
tear gases during the war (Carter 2000, 53). Instead of a prolonged use of some
chemical agents by 20% of Bomber Command, the Chiefs of Staff recommended the
concentration of all British and American long-range bombers in a “massive hammer
blow,” employing high explosives and phosgene and mustard gas bombs in quick
succession on tactical and civilian targets. Phosgene would be dropped on 1000
tactical targets or twenty German cities, causing heavy casualties and deaths among
civilians and civil defense personnel. Mustard gas, on the other hand, would be
employed against 1500 tactical targets or, alternatively, against sixty speciﬁcally
identiﬁed German cities covering the entire Reich that were “best calculated to bring
about a collapse of German morale.”76 By causing death and destruction on a mon-
umental scale, military commanders aimed to exercise intense pressure on the regime’s
leadership, but they were also acutely aware that the population was likely to lack the
necessary “initiative required for active revolt” against the Nazi regime following gas
attacks (ibid.).
73TNA, PREM3/89, Personal Minute Churchill to Ismay, 6 July 1944; also Harris and Paxman
(1982, 127ff.).
74TNA, PREM3/89, “Military Considerations Affecting the Initiation of Chemical and Other
Special Forms of Warfare”; Harris and Paxman (1982, 130ff.).
75TNA, PREM3/89, “Military Considerations Affecting the Initiation of Chemical and Other
Special Forms of Warfare.”
76TNA, PREM3/89, “Military Considerations Affecting the Initiation of Chemical and Other
Special Forms of Warfare.”
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In France, chemical weapons could aid the war effort by helping Allied forces to
“break through the German defences,” but they could also slow the military advance,
affect communications, unsettle civilian labor, and negatively affect the relationship
with the local population. The same was the case in the east, in southern France and in
the Mediterranean, where chemical warfare was seen to be counterproductive in
maintaining support from civilians and partisans. Existing chemical warfare stocks in
the Far East were deemed to be insufﬁcient to allow offensive chemical warfare to be
conducted simultaneously in both theatres of war, and defensive measure were
inadequate to protect the military from gas under tropical conditions.
Military ofﬁcials were under no illusion that Germany would immediately
retaliate against the United Kingdom, with London as the principal target, if the
Allies started to use gas warfare. Although the possible effects of gas on the home
front were difﬁcult to judge, they felt that the general public, after ﬁve years of war,
might be resentful of being exposed to toxic agents if it could be shown that this
“could have been avoided.”77 The Chiefs of Staff were also concerned about the
effects on public morale of potential retaliatory measures against Allied prisoners of
war who might be forced to “work in contaminated areas.”78 All things considered,
and irrespective of any political, legal, or moral considerations, Britain’s military
planners concluded that chemical and biological weapons were not an attractive
military proposition. General Hastings Lionel Ismay, one of Churchill’s closest
military advisers, even suggested to the Prime Minister that the use of these types of
weapons was likely to be detrimental to the Allied military campaign:
It is true that we could drench the big German cities with an immeasurably greater weight of gas
than the Germans could put down on this country. Other things being equal, this would lead to
the conclusion that it would be to our advantage to use the gas weapons. But other things are not
equal. There is no reason to believe that the German authorities would have any greater difﬁculty
in holding down the cowed German population, if they were subjected to gas attack, than they
have had during the past months of intensive high explosive and incendiary bombings. The
same cannot be said for our own people, who are in no such inarticulate condition.79
However impressive the plans drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff in July 1944 may
appear in retrospect, we still need to be careful not to jump to any conclusions, on
the basis of the above outlined memorandum, in respect of the actual state of Allied
readiness to start chemical warfare operations during the closing stages of the
Second World War. Given what we now know about newly developed operational
research methods which allowed experts to calculate more precisely the require-
ments for chemical weapons stockpiles needed for a major military attack, it seems
far from certain whether the Allied military would actually have been capable of
delivering the kind of “massive hammer blow” to the German enemy within the
77TNA, PREM3/89, “Military Considerations Affecting the Initiation of Chemical and Other
Special Forms of Warfare”; Harris and Paxman (1982, 132).
78TNA, PREM3/89, “Military Considerations Affecting the Initiation of Chemical and Other
Special Forms of Warfare.”
79TNA, PREM3/89, Personal Minute, Ismay to Churchill, 28 July 1944.
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operational realities of war conceived by the Chiefs of Staff, had the order to
employ chemical and biological weapons actually been given. As plans were drawn
up in the United States to employ chemical weapons as part of an invasion of the
Japanese home islands, for example, it became apparent that the quantitative
requirements far exceeded existing stockpiles of chemical munitions. Yet if we
assume, for a moment, that the existing chemical weapons stockpiles were likely to
be insufﬁcient for the kind of attack the Chiefs of Staff had outlined to Churchill—
who at this point seems to have been, by all accounts, keen to launch chemical
warfare operations—then this raises a series of questions: whether the Chiefs of
Staff were aware of the fact that their chemical warfare capability might not have
been quite what it seemed, and if so, why they did not communicate this fact to the
Prime Minister. The following scenario is certainly possible: under considerable
pressure from Churchill to conﬁrm the viability of employing such unorthodox
weapons, which up to this point had not been used in the war, senior military
ofﬁcials—who were keen to keep it that way—might have overstated the Allied
chemical warfare capability, thus preserving the impression that the current state of
readiness was such that chemical weapons could be employed on a massive scale
and at any time, if necessary, whilst simultaneously arguing against the immediate
use of chemical weapons in the current conflict.
Although hardly convinced by the report, Churchill decided to accept the assess-
ment of his senior ofﬁcials, at least for the time being.80 As it happened, Britain’s
Chiefs of Staff, and Churchill in particular, had no need to return to the subject of
chemical warfare. In April 1945, after Allied forces had crossed the Lower Rhine, the
Joint Intelligence Subcommittee concluded that Germany appeared unwilling and
unprepared to initiate gas warfare to defend the territory of the Reich. However, it also
counseled caution: “There remains the possibility that Hitler may recklessly order its
use in the ﬁnal stage of disintegration.”81 He never did. At the end of the month, Hitler
ended his life in his bunker beneath the Reich Chancellery. Shortly thereafter, the
unconditional surrender of the German army heralded the end of one of the most
murderous regimes in modern history, and with it came the uncomfortable realization
that Allied intelligence agencies had almost no knowledge of one of the greatest
military and scientiﬁc secrets of the Second World War: nerve gas.
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